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NOTE
WHAT YOU DO NOT KNOW CAN HURT YOU:
HOW THE FINRA EXPUNGEMENT PROCESS IS
ENDANGERING FUTURE INVESTORS THROUGH
A LACK OF INFORMATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is often said, what you do not know can not hurt you.
Unfortunately, in the high stakes world of securities investment, what
investors do not know can indeed hurt them.1 When investors did not
know that the head of a small California investment firm had a previous
claim brought against him for operating a $1.75 million Ponzi scheme,
they believed in his reputability, which led to another $125 million Ponzi
scheme over a seven-year stretch.2 A deal cut in a previous settlement
led to the lack of information on the broker's Central Registration
Depository ("CRD") record. More recently, in May 2013, a Wells
Fargo broker-who despite nine client disputes on her record, and Wells
Fargo agreeing to pay a $125,000 settlement because of a complaint
related to the broker-received an expungement award on some of the
disputes on her record after an arbitrator determined they were "suitable
and safe" for expungement (alternatively "expungement process" or
"process").4 Just a few months prior, in February of 2013, a former
1. See Rich Smith, Investing Basics: What You Don't Know Is Hurting You, DAILY FINANCE
(Apr. 22, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/04/22/investing-basics-what-youdont-know-is-hurting-you (discussing how brokers depend on the ignorance of investors).
2. Michael Freedman, The X-ed Out Files, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2000, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/1225/6616280a.html (expunging a previous customer dispute
through settlement allowed Carl Martellaro to continue his fraudulent practices without investors
becoming aware, leading to the $125 million Ponzi scheme).
3. See id. The CRD is an online registration system that houses administrative and disclosure
information about brokerage firms and associated persons. See Central Registration Depository,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD (last visited July 20, 2014).
For a further discussion about the CRD, including its reporting requirements and changes made to
the system over time, see Scott Ilgenfritz, Expungement Study of the Public Investors Arbitration
Bar Association,20 PIABA B. J. 339, 340-43 (2013).
4. Susan Antilla, A Rise in Requests From Brokers to Wipe the Slate Clean, N.Y. TIMES,
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Charles Schwab executive, who personally ran a fund which led to
investors losing hundreds of millions of dollars, was able to secure an
expungement award as well.5 Despite agreeing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") to pay a fine of $325,000 and be barred
from the business, the expungement award was the former executive's
eighth award since August 2012.6
These examples are all illustrative of the negative aspects of the
expungement process in the securities industry. 7 However, it would be
misleading to suggest that such examples make up the complete
expungement picture. There are certainly desirable expungements, such
as where an implicated broker was not actually in control of a
customer's account and had no part in the wrongdoing. 9 In such a
situation, the use of expungement is reasonable and desirable, as it does
not jeopardize the overriding intention of the expungement guidelinesfor example, investor protection-and it ensures that a broker is not
inaccurately labeled as fraudulent. 10
June 11, 2013, at B1 (stating the recommended deletion of the complaint from the broker's record
came after a hearing where only the broker was present, as the client did not attend, and the broker
went as far as to request expungement of two unrelated incidents on her record).
5. Id.
6. Id. (denying any wrongdoing, despite the sanctions levied against him, the Charles
Schwab executive will be allowed to reapply for FINRA membership in 2015).
7. See Snyder v. City of Alexandria, 870 F. Supp. 672, 683 n.28 (E.D. Va. 1994) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (5th ed. 1979)) (defining expungement of information as "[t]he act
of physically destroying information... in files, computers, or other depositories"); Examples of
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/
Expungement Orders, FINRA,
SpecialProcedures/Expungement/P126302 (last visited July 20, 2014) (providing examples of
expungement orders); Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement
Guidance, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/
Expungement (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter Notice to Arbitrators](expunging information
permanently deletes that information from the CRD system).
8. See Bill Singer, PNC Broker Exonerated in FINRA Customer Dispute But Saddled
with Expungement Ordeal, FORBES (July 6, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/billsinger/2012/07/06/pnc-broker-exonerated-in-fmra-customer-dispute-but-saddled-withexpungement-ordeal (granting expungement to a broker not named in the claim and who attempted
to deter the claimaint from investing so heavily).
9. See id.; see also Jisook Lee, A CloserLook at Expungement: Asking the Right Questions,
THE NEUTRAL CORNER (FINRA, New York, N.Y.), 2013, at 2, 3 (taking no part in the alleged
action should result in expungement); Suzanne Barlyn, COMPLY-Merrill Broker Files John Doe
Case to Clear Record Quietly, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/09/19/finra-johndoe-idUSL2NOHE19220130919 (looking favorably on requests to expunge
where customers filed claims, but ultimately did not pursue them).
10. See About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFlNRA (last visited July 20, 2014)
(outlining how FINRA accomplishes its mission of investor protection); Suzanne Barlyn,
Wall Street Watchdog to Review Tactic for Cleaning Broker Records, REUTERS
(Aug. 2, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-finra-expungementidUSBRE9710WA20130802 (presenting industry argument that "brokers' records should not have
to carry black marks from cases in which investors have not proven their claims"). Patricia Cowart,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss4/7

2

Farris: What You Do Not Know Can Hurt You: How the FINRA Expungement Proc

2014]

FINRA EXPUNGEMENTPROCESS

Brokers' desire for expungement stems from the fact that dispute
information is made publicly available through the online tool
BrokerCheck." While investors are encouraged to research broker
dealers through this online tool in order to determine whom they can
trust, industry sentiment suggests that the current expungement process
is depleting the amount of valuable information available to investors
and putting them in danger.' 2 These growing concerns with the process
come from the frequency with which investors are relying on
BrokerCheck to educate themselves with accurate information
regarding broker dealers; as industry professional Seth Lipner describes
it, "[p]eople are13 starting to use BrokerCheck the way they
use TripAdvisor."'
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") is
primarily responsible for self-regulating the securities industry and
ensuring investor protection above all else.' 4 Part of FINRA's
responsibility in regulating the securities industry is to acquire and
maintain registered broker dealer reporting information, which is then
housed in the CRD.'5 Included in the required reporting information is
customer dispute information, maintained in BrokerCheck's online
database. 16 Through BrokerCheck, investors are able to investigate a
a lawyer for Wells Fargo & Co., stated: "The importance of having an accurate and fair record will
affect (a broker's) livelihood." Id.
11. See FINRA BrokerCheck - Research Brokers, Brokerage Firms, Investment Adviser
Representatives and Investment Adviser Firms, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/nvestors/
ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter FINRA BrokerCheck].
12. Id.(encouraging investors to make BrokerCheck the first resource they utilize when
making investment decisions). While discussing investor concerns, the President of the Public
Investors Arbitration Bar Association ("PIABA"), Scott Ilgenfritz, elaborated: "To say that
Iexpungement' of customer claims from broker records is a major investor protection problem is an
understatement.... [I]nvestors who are diligent enough to seek out information about brokers may
be getting a woefully incomplete picture .. " PIABA Study: Stockbroker Arbitrations
Slates Wiped Clean 9 Out of 10 Times When "Expungement" Sought in Settled Cases, PUB.
INVESTORS ARB. BAR ASS'N 1-2 (Oct. 16, 2013), http://piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/
PIABA%2OExpungement%20Study.pdf [hereinafter PIABA Study]; see Seth E. Lipner, The
Expungement of Customer Complaint CRD Information Following the Settlement of a FINRA
Arbitration, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 102 (2013) (arguing that the current expungement
process does not work and is harming investors); Antilla, supra note 4, (erasing records of bad
brokers is happening too often according to attorneys representing investors).
13. Antilla, supra note 4.
14. About FINRA, supranote 10.
15. See Notice to Members 04-16, NASD Adopts Rule 2130 Regarding Expungement of
Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration Depository (Mar. 2004), at 212
[hereinafter Notice to Members 04-16], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/
@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003235.pdf (noting that the CRD contains administrative
information, which includes broker dealer information, as well as disclosure information, such as
customer dispute and disciplinary information).
16. See FINRA BrokerCheck,supra note 11.
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broker dealer's dispute
and arbitration history prior to entering
17
into a relationship.
Some investors are likely unaware that broker dealers can
"expunge" information from their CRD records, permanently erasing the
particular incident as if it never happened. 18 Expungement is intended to
balance the goal of protecting investors from fraudulent brokers, while
also protecting brokers against harmful reputations resulting from
meritless claims. 19 The expungement process, which began in 1981, is
currently governed under FINRA Rule 2080 and companion Rules
12805 and 13805.20
The expungement process has frequently been described by FINRA
as an "extraordinary remedy," only to be used when the information
would have no investor protection value if it were left on the respective
CRD record. 2' Despite this objective, expungement has become
something other than extraordinary-it has become ordinary.22

Expungement requests were granted in post-settlement agreement claims
96.9% of the time from 2009 through 2011, and 91.5% of the time in
2013.23 The use of settlements to obtain expungement agreements has
been viewed in the industry as a large part of the current problem.24
17. See id; see also Christine Lazaro, Ethical Concerns When Settlement Includes an
Agreement About Expungement, PIABA 22ND ANNUAL MEETING MATERIALS, 2013, at 90, 90
(using BrokerCheck to determine whether they will invest with a particular broker is an industry
known use).
18. See Freedman, supra note 2 (investing public was unaware that information had been
expunged from Martellaro's record); Notice to Arbitrators, supra note 7 (describing expungement
as an extraordinary remedy granted only in certain instances).
19. See Karen Donovan, The Expungement Crusade, REGISTERED REP., at 3 (Nov. 1, 2007)
(bringing claims without merit leads to erroneous entries on a broker's CRD).
20. See Howard R. Elisofon & Grant R. Comehis, The Road to Expungement Grows Longer,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 2010, at 1, 2. See generally FINRA MANUAL R. 2080 (2011)
(pertaining to the process for obtaining an expungement order); FINRA MANUAL R. 12805 (2011)
(pertaining to customer disputes); FINRA MANUAL R. 13805 (2011) (pertaining to industry
disputes). Rule 13805 will not be discussed further as this Note deals exclusively with customer
disputes.
21. See Lee, supra note 9, at 6; NASD Notice to Members 01-65-Request for
Comment, NASD Seeks Comment on Proposed Rules and Policies Relating to
Expungement of Information from the Central Registration Depository (Oct. 2001), at 565
[hereinafter Notice to Members 01-65], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003745.pdf; Notice to Arbitrators,supra note 7.
22. See infra Part llI.A.1.
23. Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 360; FINRA Dispute Resolution Arbitration Award Review
2013 from Steven B. Caruso (Jan. 2014) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
24. See Steven B. Caruso, Expungement Requests in Settlement Negotiations: Consequences
If You Don't Just Say No, PIABA B.J., Summer 2007, at 3, 4 (explaining potential consequences
attorneys may face because of settlement issues); Lipner, supra note 12, at 103-04 (advocating for
change of the way the current process handles settlement agreements); C. Thomas Mason, II, CRD
Expungement: Law, ProposedNASD Rules, andLawyer Ethics, PIABA B.J., Winter 2002, at 76, 96
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Despite a number of rule changes over the past fourteen years,
FINRA's expungement process still has flaws. 25 A member in the
securities industry from the Consumer Federation of America, which
works to ensure investors receive complete and accurate information,
characterized the current expungement process as:
[T]oo easy for brokers to get complaints expunged from their records,
investors who attempt to do the right thing and check out the broker's
disciplinary record may end up making their decision based on
incomplete information. Worse, they may be led to believe that a
broker has a clean disciplinary record ....
Curtailing the current use of settlement negotiations to secure
expungement is a critical first step in fixing the process.27 Further,
modifying the current Rule 12805 in order to institute greater FINRA
participation, along with more strict and defined arbitrator requirements,
is necessary as well.2 8 Finally, ensuring a further level of customer
participation than is currently required in FINRA Rule 2080 is important
in correcting the current process and ensuring that expungement awards
do not remain the frequent occurrence they currently are.29
Part II of this Note will explain the history of FINRA, and the
source of its power.30 Also in Part II, the general arbitration process and
its procedures, along with the establishment of the CRD and
(discussing the misuse of settlement negotiations); Notice to Members 04-43, Members' Use of
Affidavits in Connection with Stipulated Awards and Settlements to Obtain Expungement of
at
554,
2004),
(June
2130
Rule
Under
Information
Dispute
Customer
[hereinafter Notice to Members 04-43], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
(acknowledging the settlement
industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003015.pdf
problem). FINRA has made another attempt to fix the settlement issue in 2014-the Board of
Governors approved a rule proposal to prohibit the conditioning of settlements on expungement
awards, although the proposal still requires SEC approval. See News Release, FINRA, FINRA
Board Approves Rule Prohibiting Conditioning Settlements of Customer Disputes on a Customer's
Agreement Not to Oppose Expungement (Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter FINRA Board Approves Rule
available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/
Settlements],
Conditioning
Prohibiting
NewsReleases/2014/P44525 1.
25. Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Brokers Able to Hide Some Disputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,
2013, at Cl ("(FINRA's] attempts to mandate narrow grounds for granting expungement
relief.., have failed.").
26. PIABA Study, supra note 12, at 2 (quoting Rachel Weintraub, legislative director and
senior counsel, Consumer Federation of America).
27. See Caruso, supra note 24, at 4-5 (outlining the current issues facing investors' attorneys);
Mason, supra note 24, at 96-97 (discussing the consequences if an attorney agrees to expunge a
claim he knows is not false); see also FINRA Board Approves Rule Prohibiting Conditioning
Settlements, supranote 24 (approving a rule to attempt to deter the settlement issue).
28. SeeFINRAMANUALR. 12805 (2011).
29. See FINRA MANuAL R. 2080 (2011); infra Part IlI.A. 1 (showing expungement awards
have become common).
30. See infra Partl.A.
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BrokerCheck will be explained. 31 Finally, and most importantly, Part II
will describe the evolution of the expungement process since the
inception of the CRD in 1981, the ramifications and industry
sentiment towards the moratorium in 1999, and the new rule changes in
2004 and 2009.32
Part III will examine the current legal challenges faced by the
securities industry as a result of the expungement process. 33 The ability
of broker dealers to abuse settlement negotiations by offering a customer
a lump sum in exchange for expungement is damaging the CRD, and
resulting in a lack of faith in the expungement process.34 Moreover, the
incentive for a customer's attorney to accept such a settlement offer, in
order to secure some type of monetary award for their client, presents
legal and ethical issues for that attorney. 35 Along with the settlement
issues that currently exist, Part III will also examine the issues
surrounding the rest of the expungement guidelines, most notably the
lack of input that they solicit from the customer.3 6
Part IV will explore the scope and obligation of FINRA to alleviate
the current expungement issues outlined in Part 11I. 37 The current Rule
2080 will be used as a framework but will be modified to take into
account the need to eliminate the settlement issues, while also requiring
more extensive participation from FIINRA. 38 Also, the need for stricter
and more expansive arbitrator guidelines, along with adjustments to
secure further customer participation, will be presented as modifications
to Rule 12805. 39 Part IV will conclude with a brief overview of the
potential benefits that updated arbitrator training could provide.4 °
This Note concludes that changes to the current FINRA
expungement process are imminently necessary. 41 The current process is
providing diligent investors with incomplete information and
31. See infra Part ll.B-C.
32. See Elisofon, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that the CRD was created in 1981); NASD
Notice to Members 99-09, NASD Regulation Imposes Moratorium on Arbitrator-Ordered
Expungements of Information from the Central Registration Depository (Feb. 1999), at 47
[hereinafter Notice to Members 99-09], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p004582.pdf (introducing the moratorium on
arbitrator awarded expungements); Notice to Members 04-16, supra note 15, at 213-14 (explaining
the new rule change in 2004); infra Part I.D-E.
33. See infra Part Ii.A-B.
34. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 360-61.
35. See Caruso, supra note 24, at 4.
36. See infra PartHl.B.
37. See infra Parts HI.A-B, IV.A-B.
38. See FINRA MANUAL R. 2080 (2011); infra Part IV.A.
39. See FINRA MANUAL R. 12805 (2011); infra Part 1V.B.
40. See infra Part IV.C.
41. See infra Part V.
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endangering their decision-making process. Proposing rule changes to
the SEC will put FINRA on the path to accomplishing its desired goal of
making expungement an extraordinary remedy, instead of
expungement's current state as an ordinary occurrence.4 3
II.

FINRA's POWER AND ATTEMPTS TO FIX THE EXPUNGEMENT
PROBLEM

Since 1981, FINRA has proposed, and the SEC has passed,
numerous rules and regulations in attempting to improve the
expungement guidelines and better serve FINRA's intended purposeinvestor protection." With each new rule or regulation that was passed,
industry sentiment continued to grow; yet, the process was still not
where it needed to be in order to prevent unnecessary expungements. 45
In order to gain a better understanding of the rules that FINRA has
developed, it is helpful to look at the historical context behind the power
granted to FINRA by the SEC, and why it was so empowered, which
Subpart A will do.46 Subpart B will explore the arbitration process and
the guidelines surrounding that process, which allow for investors to
bring claims against broker dealers.4 7 Next, Subpart C will discuss the
CRD's history and relation to the birth and subsequent growth of
BrokerCheck.48 Finally, Subparts D and E will look at the history of the
expungement process, dating back to 1981, and will49 finish with an
outline of where the expungement process stands today.
A.

The Power to Regulate the SecuritiesIndustry

In 1934, the SEC was established after the passing of the Securities
Exchange Act.5 ° Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act in 1934
because it recognized that "[m]onitoring the securities industry

42. See infra Part HA-B.
43. See infra Part HI.A.1.
44. See infra Part II.D-E. Examples of passed regulations include: FINRA MANUAL R. 2080
(2011); FINRA MANUAL R. 12805 (2011); NASD MANUAL R. 2130 (2004).
45. See Caruso, supra note 24, at 4-5 (arguing settlement issues created a number of concerns
for both investors and their attorneys). See generally Lipner, supra note 12 (advocating for change
in the expungement process regarding the use of settlements); Mason, supra note 24 (outlining
issues with the entire expungement process).
46.
47.

See infra Part H.A.
See infra Partfl.B.

48. See infra Partf.C.
49. See infra Part I.D-E.
50. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (providing the SEC with the power to act as the
regulatory agency for the U.S. securities industry).
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require[d] a highly coordinated effort." 51 Congress's primary goals in
monitoring the securities industry were to protect investors, as well as to
have an agency to enforce the then-newly passed securities laws.52 Four
years after the Exchange Act was passed, Congress passed an
amendment to the act which allowed for the creation of Self Regulating
Organizations ("SRO") to be formed underneath the supervision of the
SEC. The amendment "gave legislative approval to the formation of
national securities associations designed to supervise their members'
conduct under the general oversight of the Securities Exchange
Commission. 54 Although there was no maximum number of
organizations that could apply to the SEC for SRO status, only one
organization applied after the 1938 amendment, the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 55After applying to the SEC
for recognition, the NASD was approved in 1939.56 Years later, the
NASD merged with the New York Stock Exchange Regulation to form
FINRA in 2008."7 FINRA subsequently made its mission both investor
58
protection and market integrity.
51. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling SelfRegulation and the NationalMarket System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1074-75 (2005) (concerning
practices of stock exchange, members and manipulative practices were part of Congress's rationale
for the Exchange Act); The Investor's Advocate. How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtm (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter The Investor's
Advocate].
52. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 51; see also John E. Tracy & Alfred Brunson
MacChesney, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1037-39 (1934) (creating
the SEC for regulation of industry).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006) (amending the Securities Exchange Act, the Maloney Act of
1938 allowed for the creation of SRO).
54. Rebecca Cumin, Note, The NASD 's Fair Sales Practice Rules: An Argument for Their
Application to Government Securities Transactions, andfor the Consideration of Some New Rules
in the Mortgage Market, 1993 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 191, 193 (1993).
55. See Tamar Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6. B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
187, 205-06 (1965); Onnig, supra note 51, at 1076-77 (describing the 1938 amendment and the
incentives provided to individuals who became members of the NASD); Marianne K. Smythe,
Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws:
Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 485 (1984) (allowing for creation of
additional SROs but only the NASD was formed after passage of act).
56. See Hed-Hofmann, supranote 55, at 188 (celebrating its twentieth anniversary in 1959).
57. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to
Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member
Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., 73 Fed. Reg. 32377, 32377 (June
6, 2008); Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA (July 30, 2007) (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review) [hereinafter FINRA, NASD] (announcing the commenced operations of FINRA).
58. About FINRA, supra note 10; FINRA, NASD, supra note 57; see also What We Do,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo (last visited July 20, 2014) (outlining the
five ways that FINRA achieves its purpose).
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B. An Overview of the FINRA ArbitrationProcess
"Arbitration is an alternative to litigation or mediation," with a
panel composed of one or three arbitrators.5 9 The award issued by the
arbitration panel is universally binding, requiring all parties to abide by
the decision unless it is successfully challenged in court. 60 "Arbitration,
[which] is generally confidential," 6' begins when a party files a claim
requesting a specific remedy, and the respondent subsequently answers
such a claim.62 The selection of the arbitration panel depends on the
amount of money in controversy. 63 Following arbitrator selection, the
parties will have a telephonic prehearing conference, participate in
discovery, and have a hearing in front of the arbitration panel, 64 where
after the panel will make a decision and potentially grant awards.65

59. Arbitration
Overview,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitration/Overview (last visited July 20, 2014). Arbitration became an entrenched aspect of the
securities industry after the landmark decision Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon. See
generally 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Shearson court found that claims brought under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act could utilize arbitration under pre-dispute agreements. Id. at 238. As a
result of the holding in Shearson, resolving securities disputes via arbitration has become the
industry norm. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 361, 368-69 (1987) (reasoning just a year after the decision that arbitration would become
the primary forum); Antilla, supra note 4, (noting that arbitration resulted in firms insisting that
customers give up the right to sue in court).
60. Arbitration Overview, supra note 59.
61. Id. However, disciplinary decisions and the subsequent disciplinary action documents are
available and can be obtained through FINRA's website. See 2013 OHO DisciplinaryDecisions,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ndustry/Enforcement/Adjudication/OHO/DisciplinaryDecisions/20 13
(last visited July 20, 2014) (providing past years' decisions, but not yet 2014 decisions); F/NRA
Disciplinary Actions Online Database, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/
DisciplinaryActions/FDAS (last visited July 20, 2014).
62. Arbitration
Process,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitration/Process (last visited July 20, 2014) (following the filing of a claim is the selection of the
arbitration panel).
63. Arbitrator
Selection,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbtitration/Process/ArbitratorSelection/index.htm (last visited July 20, 2014) (providing three
arbitrators for claims exceeding $100,000 and one arbitrator for claims between $50,000 and
$100,000). During the selection process FINRA will send a list of qualified arbitrators to each party,
allowing each party to strike up to four arbitrators from the list, leaving the ultimate selection of the
panel up to FINRA; for claims of $50,000 or less, FINRA will appoint one arbitrator for a
simplified arbitration procedure. Id.
64. Arbitration Process, supra note 62; see also Discovery, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Process/Discovery/index.htm
(last visited July 20, 2014)
(subjecting the discovery process to The Codes of Arbitration Procedure); Hearings, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Process/Hearings/index.htm (last visited
July 20, 2014) (involving motions, cross-examination, and testimony, similar to a trial).
65. Arbitration Process, supra note 62; Decision & Awards, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediationArbitration/Process/DecisionAwards/index.htm
(last visited July 20,
2014).
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C. Establishingan InformationalDatabasefor the Securities Industry
As the securities industry was rapidly growing, the NASD needed
to ensure that it could maintain, and subsequently dispense to the public,
the registration and dispute information of the thousands of broker
dealers that were forming in the industry.66 Thus, the NASD created the
CRD in 1981 .67 The CRD houses registered firm and individual broker
information, which includes customer dispute information disclosures.68
Customer dispute information consists of "customer complaints,
arbitration claims,. . . court filings made by customers, and the
arbitration awards or court judgments that may result from those claims
or filings. 69
F1NRA gathers the information found on the CRD through the
completion of required registration forms. 70 The most commonly
referred to forms in the industry are the U-4 and U-5, which are used for
the registration and termination of associated persons.71 Customer
dispute information reported on FINRA's registration forms is made
available through the investor tool BrokerCheck. 2 What started as the
NASD's Public Disclosure Program in 1988 became known as
BrokerCheck in 2003.73 BrokerCheck is a free tool for investors,
intended to assist their investing decisions by providing professional
background information on current and former FINRA-registered
brokerage firms and brokers.7 4 FINRA intends for BrokerCheck to be the
66. See CRD & lARD, N. AM. SEC. ADMINSTRATORS Ass'N, http://www.nasaa.org/industryresources/investment-advisers/crd-iard (last visited July 20, 2014) (sharing the responsibility of
maintaining the system with the North American Securities Administrators Association
("NASAA")).
67. Id.
68. See Elisofon, supra note 20, at 1 (including criminal and disciplinary history and civil
litigation history too); Central Registration Depository, supra note 3 (operating as the central
licensing and registration system); CRD & lARD, supra note 66.
69. Notice to Members 04-16, supra note 15, at 212 ("[C]ontain[ing] allegations that a
member or one or more of its associated persons has violated securities laws, rules, or
regulations.").
70. See Current Uniform Registration Forms for Electronic Filing in Web CRD, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/industry/compliance/registration/crd/filingguidance/pO05235 (last visited July
20, 2014) (listing all registration forms required by FINRA). For the purposes of this Note, only the
U-4, U-5, U-6, BD, and BDW are relevant.
71. See id.Forms BD and BDW are used for SEC registration and Form U-6 reports
disciplinary action. Id.
72. FINRA BrokerCheck, supra note 11.
73. See Regulatory Notice 12-10, FINRA Requests Comment on Ways to Facilitate and
Increase Investor Use of BrokerCheck Information, FINRA (Feb. 2012), at 2,
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p 125621 .pdf
(establishing the program in 1988).
74. FINRA BrokerCheck, supra note 11 (containing background information for
approximately 1.3 million FINRA-registered brokers and 17,400 FINRA-registered brokerage
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first resource that investors turn to when contemplating investment
relationships.75 BrokerCheck is a valuable source of information because
it provides investors with "information about their registered
representative before [the customers] open [their] account[s]. ' ' 76
Moreover, because most investor claims will be heard through private
arbitration, the CRD and BrokerCheck are the public's only access to
information about legal proceedings brought by customers.7 7
The information available on BrokerCheck was enhanced by a
FINRA rule change in May 2009.78 Prior to May 18, 2009, there were
only two categories of customer complaints that required reporting on
Forms U-4 and U-5: (1) customer initiated sales practice violations; and
(2) customer-initiated investment-related arbitration in which the broker
was a named respondent.79 Missing from the required reporting,
however, were actions where a registered representative was identified
through arbitration as being involved in the practice violations, but was
not a named respondent. 80 This anomaly was corrected when the SEC
approved FINRA's proposed rule change, 8 which incorporated two
additional questions into the Form U-4 and Form U-5; this could
incidentally be responsible for the higher expungement requests since
2009, due to more82 broker reporting and subsequently more
desired expungements.

firms).
75. Id
76. Transcript of Testimony of Adam Levitt, Chairman, Concerning the Large Firm Project,
(Sept. 14, 1994), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/rogue2.txt. Finding a trustworthy
and reliable representative is essential. Id.
77. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 95 (providing that Internet access to arbitration information
fills a significant gap in the public record).
78. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change as Modified by Amendment No. 1 and
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Filing as Amended by Amendment
No. 2 Relating to Changes to Forms U4, U5, and FINRA Rule 8312, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-59916, 95 SEC Docket 2283 (Dec. 7, 2009) (approving SR-FINRA-2009-008).
79. See Ilgenfritz, supranote 3, at 341-42.
80. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Proposed Rule Changes to
Forms U4 and U5, 74 Fed. Reg. 13491, 13491-92 (Mar. 27, 2009) (stating purposes for rule
change); Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 342 (regarding the absence of a requirement to report to
FINRA).
81. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change as Modified by Amendment No. 1 and Notice
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Filing as Amended by Amendment No. 2
Relating to Changes to Forms U4, U5, and FINRA Rule 8312, 74 Fed. Reg. 23750, 23751 (May 20,
2009).
82. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 342, 359 (requiring registered representatives to report
being the subject of investment related, customer-initiated arbitration claims within the past twentyfour months, even when not named as a defendant, brought about expected results); Antilla, supra
note 4 (increasing requests was likely a result of the rule change in 2009).
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D. The Initial Expungement Process and Subsequent
MoratoriumRule Changes
The process through which customer dispute information was
expunged from a broker's CRD record went unchanged from the
inception of the CRD in 1981 until 1999. 83 During that time, the NASD
took the position that expungement ordered by an arbitrator should be
afforded the same treatment as court-ordered expungement 4 A
disconnect between the NASD and the North American Securities
Administrators Association ("NASAA") led to the 1999 moratorium
imposed by the NASD.
Because of the disconnect between the NASD and NASAA, 86 the
NASD imposed a moratorium solely on arbitrator awarded
expungements in February 1999, meaning that a customer dispute record
would not be expunged unless it was confirmed by a court of appropriate
jurisdiction. 87 The moratorium was met with serious opposition from
members of the securities industry.88 Following the moratorium, a multiyear effort was undertaken by the NASD to formulate and propose a new
rule regarding the expungement process. 89 After circulating the text of
83. Elisofon, supra note 20, at 2 (expunging information from the CRD system was permitted
on the basis of an arbitration award directing such relief).
84. See Notice to Members 99-09, supranote 32, at 47.
85. See id. (disagreeing with the position that an arbitrator awarded expungement should be
afforded the same treatment as an award granted by a court); see also Our Role, N. AM. SEC.
ADMINSTRATORS ASS'N, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role (last visited July 20, 2014)
(working within state governments, the NASAA state securities regulators protect the investing
public).
86. See supra note 85.
87. See Notice to Members 99-09, supra note 32, at 47 ("NASD Regulation will not expunge
information from the CRD system based on a directive contained in an arbitration award.., unless
the award has been confirmed by a court of competent jurisdiction.").
88. Mason, supra note 24, at 77; Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell to Joan C. Conley (July 30,
1999), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=1365 (recommending a return to premoratorium practices); NASD Notice to Members 99-54, NASD Regulation Seeks Comment on
Issues Relating to Arbitrator-Ordered Expungements of Information from the Central Registration
Depository (July 1999), at 352 [hereinafter Notice to Members 99-54], available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p04219.pdf
(acknowledging the opposing view of Florida's Attorney General and NASAA).
89. See Proposed Rule 2130 Governing Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from
the Central Registration Depository (CRD System), File No. SR-NASD-2002-168 (Nov. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47435.htm (providing initial rule proposal to SEC for
review); Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Proposed Rule 2130 Concerning the
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration Depository, 68 Fed.
Reg. 11435, 11435 (Mar. 10, 2003) (filing amendment to 2130; proposing new rule by the NASD);
Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1, Thereto, and Notice of
Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 2, Thereto, Relating to
Proposed NASD Rule 2130 Concerning the Expungement of Customer Dispute Information From
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the new rule for comments and concerns from members of the
industry, 90 the NASD proposed Rule 2130 to the SEC; it was
subsequently confirmed and put into effect by the SEC in 2004. 9 1
Rule 2130 attempted to establish an approach to expungement that
would challenge expungement awards "that might diminish or impair the
integrity of the system and to ensure the maintenance of essential
information for regulators and investors. 9 2 In reaching the basis for the
new rule, the NASD concluded it must balance the interests of three
separate groups: (1) regulators; (2) the brokerage community; and (3) the
investing community. 93 The NASD's new rule held over the requirement
from the 1999 moratorium that a court of competent jurisdiction must
order or confirm all expungement directives.94 Further, Rule 2130
required that in order to expunge customer dispute information, the
arbitrator must find that: "(A) the claim, allegation, or information is
factually impossible or clearly erroneous; (B) the registered person was
not involved in the alleged investment-related sales practice violation,
forgery, theft, misappropriation, or conversion of funds; or (C) the claim,
allegation, or information is false. 9 5 Thus, when a respondent sought
expungement relief in arbitration, the respondent had to ask for
expungement in his prayer for relief, and the arbitrator thereafter decided
whether to grant the expungement request on the basis of at least one of
the three articulated standards.96 If an expungement award was granted
by the arbitrator, the party seeking to enforce the award not only had to
seek a court order to confirm the award, the party also had to name the
NASD as an additional party to the request and serve the NASD with all
appropriate documents, unless the NASD waived the requirement. 97 The
notice of Rule 2130's approval 98 was short lived though, as the NASD
the Central Registration Depository System, 68 Fed. Reg. 74667, 74667 (Dec. 24, 2003).
90. See Notice to Members 01-65, supra note 21, at 563 (seeking specific comment on
whether it should limit expungement to cases where order is based on one of three listed findings).
91. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 74667 (ordering approval of proposed rule); Notice to Members 0416, supra note 15, at 211 (informing members that the SEC had confirmed Rule 2130 and it was
now in effect).
92. See Notice to Members 04-16, supra note 15, at 212.
93. See id. at 212-13 (protecting the ability of both investors and regulators to obtain
meaningful data).
94. Id.at213.
95. NASD MANUALR. 2130(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2004).
96. Notice to Members 04-16, supra note 15, at 213.
97. See id. at 214. "[The] NASD will waive the obligation to be named as a party if [the]
NASD determines that the expungement relief is based on an affirmative finding that the
expungement meets one or more of the standards in the rule." Id. However, "[if the] NASD staff
determines that the expungement was not based on one or more of the standards in Rule 2130, it
will advise the parties that NASD will not waive the requirement .. ." Id.
98. Seegenerallyid.
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soon after released another notice, which addressed the growing
industry concerns about the mistreatment of the expungement process
through settlement. 99
E. The Use of Affidavits in Connection with StipulatedAwards and
Settlements and the Clarificationof ArbitratorRequirements
The NASD's notice addressing the use of affidavits in connection
with settlements was released in June 2004, shortly after the approval of
Rule 2130.100 There were a growing number of instances in the industry
where a claimant would receive a monetary award through settlement in
return for a customer affidavit absolving the respondent(s) of
responsibility for the wrongdoing.' 01 The NASD conceded that the
affidavits submitted with the settlement terms were usually inconsistent
with the initial claim that had been filed against the respondent broker. 102
Prior to the NASD's notice, some industry members had already
03
recognized this trend, even before Rule 2130 was implemented.
Included in the June 2004 notice, the NASD alerted the industry
that they would begin taking action regarding the abuse of settlement
proceedings by requiring arbitrators to undergo training to help alert
themselves of such concerns.10 4 Further, the NASD required any party
requesting a waiver of the NASD's participation in a court proceeding to
also submit a copy of the claim, and all settlement documents and
affidavits.' °5 Finally, the NASD went so far as to threaten potential
disciplinary action by the NASD's Department of Enforcement, but
made no indication that any present cases of concern would be
06
reinvestigated and subject to discipline. 1
Despite the notice from the NASD, concerns continued to grow as
members of the industry observed more and more oral requests to
99. See generally Notice to Members 04-43, supra note 24.
100. Id. at 553.
101. Id. at 554.
102. Id.
103. See Mason, supra note 24, at 96 ("[T]he brokerage industry has taken matters privately
into its own hands and for a number of years has been abusing the issue of expungement by using it
as a settlement demand.").
104. See Notice to Members 04-43, supra note 24, at 555 (training advised arbitrators to
consider the original claim filed and the settlement terms when assessing credibility). For current
arbitrator training materials, see Training, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitrators/Training (last visited July 20, 2014) (containing links for required training, advanced
training, and the written materials). See generally FINRA Dispute Resolution Expungement, FINRA
(Feb. 2014), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbtors/documents/
arbmed/p125419.pdf (providing the written training regarding expungement requests).
105. Notice to Members 04-43, supra note 24, at 555.
106. Id.
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consent to expungement as part of a settlement. 0 7 These requests come
with both practical and legal consequences for a customer's attorney in
future claims. 108 As noted by an industry member, agreeing to a
settlement is not a matter of negotiation, but instead is a professional
responsibility decision.10 9
After the NASD issued its notice in June 2004 as the initial
response to these concerns, 10 a new rule outlining additional arbitrator
requirements was proposed and received SEC approval in 2008."l ' The
rule implemented new procedures, taking effect in January 2009, for
arbitrators to follow when considering requests for expungement
relief. 1 2 Under these rules, arbitrators were required to: (1) hold a
recorded hearing session by telephone or in person; (2) in cases
involving a settlement, review the settlement documents to examine the
amount paid to any party and any other terms and conditions of the
settlement; (3) provide a brief written explanation of the reasons for
ordering expungement; and (4) assess forum fees for hearing sessions
held solely for the purpose of considering expungement against the
parties requesting the relief.' ' 3 FINRA informed members that these
procedures were put into place to add transparency to the process and
install even further assurances that expungement relief was only granted
under the appropriate circumstances. 1 4 In accordance with the issuance
of Rule 12805, FINRA required that arbitrators certify that they had
familiarized themselves with the new rules, which was achieved through
completion of one of six provided training methods." 15
107. See Caruso, supra note 24, at 4 (requesting such action typically came when discussing "a
stipulated arbitration award, on the basis of Rule 2130(b)(1)(C). . . which states that 'the claim,
allegation, or information is false').
108. Id. (including future cases where it can be indicated that a customer's counsel has a "track
record" of filing false claims based on his history of retracting claims in expungement settlements,
while "false" claims filed in an expungement suit could lead to possible sanctions from the
respective state bar).
109. See Mason, supra note 24, at 96 (agreeing to an expungement in settlement "means you
agree that the claim was baseless, unmeritorious, even frivolous," thus, you must not agree unless
you have made a genuine mistake).
110. See Notice to Members 04-43, supranote 24, at 553.
111. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of Arbitration
Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When Considering Requests for
Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 66086, 66086 (Nov. 6, 2008).
112. See Regulatory Notice 08-79, SEC Approves Rules Establishing Procedures for
Arbitrators
Considering
Expungement
Requests,
FINRA
(Dec.
2008),
at
1-2,
http://www.finra.org/web/groups.industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/docuements/notices/pI 17540.pdf.
113. Id.at2-3.
114. Id. at2.
115. Id. at 4 (training methods included: reviewing written correspondence with a question and
answer; reviewing a broadcast email with the same content as the written correspondence; listening
to the audio workshop on expungement that FINRA broadcasted; reading Regulatory Notice 08-79;
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FINRA made no further attempts at expungement change until
updating the expungement portion of its website at the beginning of
2014.116 The "guidance and reminder" was meant to remind arbitrators
of their role in the expungement process, specifically the importance of17
their unique role in maintaining the CRD's informational integrity."
Further, FINRA reiterated how essential accurate and complete
information is to investors, as well as the importance of reviewing all
appropriate documentation and providing a written explanation." 8 Most
recently, FINRA's Board has approved a rule proposal addressing the
conditioning of settlements on expungement
agreements, and has
19
review."
for
SEC
the
to
rule
the
submitted
III.

INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT EXPUNGEMENT PROCESS

It would be inaccurate to suggest that FINRA has idly sat by while
the industry clamored for expungement changes, as FINRA has made
multiple attempts at resolving the deficiencies with the expungement
process over the past fourteen years. 120 FINRA has implemented these
rule changes in an attempt to ensure its overriding expungement
purpose, that information only be expunged if it no longer has
meaningful investor protection value. 12 ' Despite these attempts though,
expungement continues to be a far too ordinary occurrence, and thus,
decreases the completeness of the BrokerCheck resource with each
accurate dispute that is expunged from a broker's record. 122 Industry
experts continue to advocate for changes of the flawed procedures, with
the most recent being the incoming President of the Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association ("PIABA"): "The expungement process for
taking the revised online expungement training module; and reading an article on expungement
published in the arbitrator and mediator newsletter). Arbitrators certified they completed the training
through a mailed-in form or online certification. Id.For current training materials, see supra note
104.
116. See generally Notice to Arbitrators,supra note 7.
117. See id.
118. Id. (reminding arbitrators that the written explanation can not be solely a recitation of one
of the Rule 2080 grounds, arbitrators need to instead identify the documentation or evidence that
was relied upon to make the expungement decision).
119. See FINRA Board Approves Rule Prohibiting Conditioning Settlements, supra note 24
(notifying members of rule approval); Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 2081
(Prohibited Conditions Relating to Expungement of Customer Dispute Information), File No. SR2014-020 (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/RuleFilings/2014/P485127
(proposing rule to SEC).
120. See supra Part l.D-E.
121. See Notice to Arbitrators,supra note 7.
122. See lgenfritz, supranote 3, at 361 (suggesting that accurate expungements are adversely
affecting the CRD); Mason, supra note 24, at 77 (undermining the CRD's accuracy by getting
accurate material expunged); infra Part HI.A.1.
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stockbrokers in arbitration cases is clearly broken today and needs
fixing. We have believed for some time now that expungements are a
,,123
significant investor protections issue ....
Particularly concerning to industry members is the misuse of
settlement negotiations to obtain expungement orders and the subsequent
adverse effect it has had on the expungement process. 124 Subpart A of
this Part will further examine the settlement issues damaging the
expungement process. 125 Aside from the specific settlement issue, the
12 6
general expungement guidelines are also not serving their purpose.
Subpart B will discuss the issues surrounding the general guidelines,
most specifically, the lack of defined requirements for arbitrators to
follow and the negative effect that the customer's absence has on an
expungement hearing. 121
A.

The Abuse of the Expungement Process Through Settlement

In claims between customers and broker dealers ending in
settlement, the broker dealers often provide terms within the settlement
agreement to facilitate their expungement request, which has led to
multiple issues involving the expungement process. 128 The use of
settlements as a tool to obtain expungement awards is not a problem that
suddenly appeared-it has been a point of constant discussion among
industry members for over a decade. 129 The primary tactic that has been
called into question is a respondent's offer of monetary compensation in
123. PIABA Study, supra note 12, at 2 (quoting Jason R. Doss, incoming President, PIABA).
Doss continued, "the consequences for the information relied upon by investors and investor
confidence in the financial markets must be seen as paramount here. This situation cannot be
allowed to go unaddressed." Id.
124. See Caruso, supra note 24, at 4-5 (misusing settlements creates ethical concerns for
investor attorneys); Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 360 (arguing expungement has become an ordinary
remedy in settlement cases); Lipner, supra note 12, at 95-96 (expunging claims based on settlement
agreements risks removal of valuable information from the CRD); Mason, supra note 24, at 77
(inserting expungement demands into settlements is an abuse of the process); PIABA Study, supra
note 12, at 2 ("Regulators need to step in and crack down on the granting of expungements
particularly in settled cases." (quoting Scott Ilgenfritz, current President, PIABA)).
125. See infra Part lII.A.
126. See infra Part III.B.
127. See infra Part III.B.
128. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Codes of
Arbitration Procedure to Establish New Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When Considering
Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 18308, 18309 (Apr. 3, 2008) (providing an example
where a customer is required to accept such stipulation); Notice to Members 01-65, supra note 21,
at 567 (identifying the concern that brokers will condition settlement awards on expungement
agreements); Lazaro, supra note 17, at 94 (requesting expungement through settlements poses
ethical concerns).
129. See supranotes 24, 124.
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exchange for an agreement to not oppose the respondent's expungement
request.1 30 Such a monetary offer often puts pressure on the customer
and the customer's attorney to accept a deal that grants expungement
because, "even if '[the attorney] and [his] client thought the guy was
guilty as sin [they] would still do it, because [they] wouldn't get money
unless [they] agreed to that." ' 3' Therein lies the problem; customers and
32
their attorneys are feeling forced into accepting an offer.
As industry concern over settlement abuse grew over time, FINRA
imposed numerous regulations in attempt to solve the settlement
problem. 33 FINRA recognized that this type of bargaining in a
settlement agreement could result in the "buying of a clean record and
would make a mockery of any affirmative determination of one of the
three grounds in Rule 2130 by a panel of arbitrators."' 34 Prior to
instituting Rule3512805, FINRA even admitted that there were flaws in
the guidelines. 1
However, despite the numerous rule changes, notable flaws
regarding the handling of settlements still exist. 36 Since disputes
generally settle at an early stage in the claim-before a hearing of
evidence-it remains unclear how arbitrators make definitive
expungement determinations. 37 Further, a customer's oral requests to
consent to an expungement award after settlement places all burdens and
130. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 96; Eaglesham & Barry, supranote 25 ("[E]xpungement has
gone from being a means to correct genuine errors into a 'tool for brokers and their firms ...
(quoting Bruce Oakes)).
131. NASD Names Itself a Party to Expungement Proceedings in New Rule, SEC. WK., Mar.
15, 2004, at 1 (quoting Kord Lagemann).
132. See Elisofon, supra note 20, at 3.
133. See supra Part II.E. In addressing concerns, FINRA has reiterated to members that they
must "observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."
Notice to Members 04-43, supra note 24, at 555.
134. Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 349 (internal quotations omitted); see Notice to Members 0444, Impermissible Confidentiality Provisions and Complaint Withdrawal Provisions in Settlement
Agreements (June 2004), at 558, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/
@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003012.pdf (reminding members that conditioning
settlements on withdrawal of complaints is impermissible).
135. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Codes of
Arbitration Procedure to Establish New Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When Considering
Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 18308, 18309 (Apr. 3, 2008) (admitting that
arbitrators would sometimes order expungement on the merits of the case, but would more often
grant expungement in order to facilitate settlement of the dispute).
136. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text; Part llI.A.1-3.
137. Dan Jamieson, Record-Cleaning Rules for Registered Reps to Get Finra Tweak,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20130806?FREE/130809952# [hereinafter Jamieson, Record-Cleaning]. Even when the arbitration
panel hears evidence it is almost always one-sided, as the customer rarely participates, which
provides the same unclear picture of how an arbitrator is to make a definitive decision. See Lipner,
supra note 12, at 88.
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potential ramifications on the customer's counsel. 13 8 Moreover, the
money offered through settlement leads to the assumption that a clean
record is being bought, as paying a large sum of money certainly
way
suggests some form of culpability. 139 Put in the most ' 14succinct
0
possible, "[e]xpungement is just too easy after settlement.
The review of expungement statistics regarding disputes that
resulted in a settlement agreement is a useful way to demonstrate the
issues just discussed, which Subpart A. 1, will examine. 41 Further, as a
result of the demonstrated issues involving settlement in expungement
claims, ethical issues are likely to arise too, which will be considered in
Subpart A.2.142 Finally, the discussed settlement issues have not gone
unnoticed by members of public office, thus Subpart A.3 will detail
a stance against the abuse of
members of public office who have taken
43
settlement in expungement proceedings.1
1. Statistical Analysis of Settlements Agreeing to Expungement
Awards
Dating back as early as 2006, a study performed by PIABA
analyzing 200 settlement award cases found that out of the 185 where
brokers requested expungement, 182 were successful.'44 In the two years
prior to the institution of Rule 12805, expungement was granted roughly
89% of the time in cases resolved by settlement that subsequently sought
an expungement award.145 After the institution of the new rule, in a span
of approximately seven months-from May 2009 to December 2009out of a total of 199 settlements that agreed to an expungement, only 6
of those expungement requests were denied. 46 The study continued,
finding that from May 2009 through the end of December 2011, a total
of 483 settlements agreeing to expungement were entered, with only 15

138. See Caruso, supra note 24, at 4.
139. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 362 ("Member firms do not pay substantial sums to
claimants when investors' claims are clearly erroneous ....); Dan Jamieson, New Finra Rules
Could Help Brokers Clear Records in Certain Cases: Regulator Working on Dual Tracks But
Specifics and Timing Remain Uncertain, INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:57 PM),
[hereinafter Jamieson, New
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130808/FREE/130809919
FinraRules]; Lee, supranote 9, at 4.
140. Barlyn, supra note 10 (quoting Seth Lipner).
141. See infra Part IM.A.1.
142. See infra Part m.A.2.
143. See infra Part II.A.3.
144. Donovan, supra note 19, at 3. The study found that in 130 of those 200 cases, arbitrators
granted expungement before any hearing on the merits of a case went forward. Id.
145. Ilgenfritz, supranote 3, at 360 (dating back to January 1, 2007 through May 2009).
146. Id.at 357.
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of those expungement requests being denied.1 47 That is nearly a 97%
find a way to expunge their
success rate for broker dealers seeking 14to
8
records through settlement negotiations.
Separately, more recent studies have shown similar results to the
previously mentioned research. 149 Lipner, an attorney who represents
investors against brokers, analyzed 150 expungement requests from the
fourth quarters of 2011 and 2012 that resulted from settlements, and
discovered that arbitrators had granted expungement in all butfive of the
cases.15 ° The most recent analysis of all 2013 settlement cases indicates
that out of 353 total expungement requests brought for post-settlement
confirmation, only thirty were denied. 15 ' That equates to a 91.5%
success rate for broker dealers who sought expungement through
settlement this past calendar year.' 5 2 These settlement agreements
leading to expungement not only endanger investors, but also
present further legal
issues for customer attorneys who are agreeing to
53
1
settlements.
such
2. Problems Faced by Customer Attorneys After Agreeing to a
Settlement
When a customer agrees to a settlement offer in exchange for their
agreement to expunge the dispute from the broker's record, it may not
affect the customer, but it presents practical, legal, and collateral
consequences for the customer's attorney. 54 The burden and
ramifications are placed squarely on the attorney who accepts such an
offer on behalf of the client.' 55 An attorney who agrees to expunge a
147. Id. at 359.
148. See id.
149. See supranotes 144-48 and accompanying text.
150. Antilla, supranote 4. In his most recent analysis of the first six months of 2013, Professor
Lipner looked at 205 and found that only 13 resulted in a denial, and in only 3 of the cases did the
investor object to expungement. Lipner, supra note 12, at 92. In each of the 3 cases where the
investor objected, the request for expungement was denied. Id. For a more detailed analysis of
Professor Lipner's most recent research, see id.at 91-95.
151. FINRA Dispute Resolution Arbitration Award Review 2013, supra note 23. The research
also indicates the Rule 2080(b)(1) predicate that was cited by the arbitrators when granting
expungement and found that predicate (c), "the claim, allegation, or information is false" was the
primary factor cited, roughly 79% of the time. Id.; FINRA MANUAL R. 2080(b)(1)(C) (2011).
Factor (a), "the claim, allegation, or information is factually impossible or clearly erroneous" was
cited the second most, approximately 67% of the time. FINRA Dispute Resolution Arbitration
Award Review 2013, supranote 23; FINRA MANUAL R. 2080(b)(l)(A) (2011).
152. FINRA Dispute Resolution Arbitration Award Review 2013, supranote 23.
153. See infra Part IlI.A.2.
154. Caruso, supra note 24, at 4-5; Lazaro, supra note 17, at 94-95 (presenting two possible
ethical concerns: (1) an attorney's obligation of candor; and (2) whether the attorney knowingly
filed a frivolous and meritless claim).
155. Caruso, supranote 24, at 4 (describing settlement abuse as the "flavor of the month").
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claim and admit on the record that the claim filed was "false,"
puts himself in danger of both earning a reputation as an attorney who
files false claims, and receiving severe sanctions from his respective
bar association for filing a false claim.1 16 A customer's attorney
who files an honest, non-frivolous claim can not accept a deal
agreeing to expungement, as it would require the attorney to agree the
claim was false.' 5 7
3. Challenges From Public Office
In 2006 and 2007, a Maryland broker named Joseph Karsner
received eighteen separate arbitrator expungements that had been
preceded by settlement, which prompted the Maryland Securities
Commissioner to interject. 58 One of the claims even involved an
arbitrator dissenting because the panel's conclusion had been based on
no actual evidence. 159 Accusing Karsner of "dishonest and unethical"
practices, 160 the Maryland Securities Commissioner successfully
interjected into the court confirmation claim,' 6' but eventually settled
with Karsner1 62 As a crystal clear indication of what likely occurs in
many settlement negotiations that involve expungement, Karsner wrote
to FINRA that an offer to settle with a customer for $15,000 would be
"automatically reduced163 to $9,999 if [the customer denied] the
expungement request."'
Similar to the situation that took place in Maryland, New York's
former Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo, also attempted to interject
into a number of expungement claims in 2007.164 Cuomo intervened in
seven separate cases, arguing, among other things, that expungements
156. Id.; see also Lazaro, supra note 17, at 95-96 (asserting that while no attorney wants to file
a meritless claim, possible sanctions are unlikely). Along with the name of the lawyer being
associated with filing a false claim, the investor's name will also be associated with filing a false
claim, because when expungement is granted, the FINR.A award database will list the award with
the investor's name in a caption and will likely contain a "finding" that the complaint was false or
erroneous. Lipner, supra note 12, at 102.
157. Mason, supra note 24, at 96.
158. Lipner, supra note 12, at 76 (objecting to one of the cases where expungement was
sought).
159. Antilla, supra note 4 ("It is the responsibility of the panel to see through a ruse such as
this." (quoting Sidney Werner, arbitrator)).
160. Id.
161. Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reversing the lower court). For a
further analysis of the Karsner decision, including whether courts have the power to confirm
arbitration expungement awards, see Lipner, supra note 12, at 76-78.
162. Antilla, supra note 4 (agreeing not to seek a broker's license until 2016); Lipner, supra
note 12, at 78 (consenting to engaging in dishonest and unethical practices).
163. Antilla, supranote 4.
164. See Donovan, supra note 19, at 1 (believing complaints were expunged too easily).
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were being bought and violated public policy. 165 The request to intervene
was based on Cuomo's role as a securities regulator and interest in
preserving state records. 66 However, the N.Y. Courts pointed to the lack
of judicial requirements to confirm an expungement award. 167 Thus,
despite successfully intervening in all but one case, Cuomo was
unsuccessful in his 68attempts to overturn the expungements and
implement his policy.1
B. FINRA's Deficient Expungement Guidelines
While a majority of expungement issues stem from the previously
discussed settlement agreement problem,1 69 the general expungement
guidelines regulating the granting of all expungement awards are
"seriously flawed," too.' 70 A primary concern surrounding the
guidelines, including both Rule 2080 and Rule 12805, is that arbitrators
do not appear to be applying either guideline when making expungement
determinations. 171 Moreover, "arbitrators do not appear to appreciate the
importance of the accuracy
of disclosure information in the CRD system
' 172
to investor protection.
A likely source of these issues 1 3 is the current unclear arbitrator
guidelines. 74 As one court described it, nothing in Rule 2080 "tells the
165. Lipner, supra note 12, at 79. The seven cases in which Cuomo intervened were: In re
Johnson v. Summit Equities, Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 873, 881 (Sup. Ct. 2008); In re Kay v. Abrams, 853
N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (Sup. Ct. 2008); In re BNY Inv. Ctr. Inc. v. Bacchus, No. 0109678/2007, 2008
WL 2490062 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2008); In re Walker v. Connelly, No. 52161, slip op. at 2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Zaferiou v. Holgado, No. 102996/07, 2008 WL 6677787, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 14, 2008); Sage, Rutty & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 2007-01942, 2007 WL 2174117, at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007); In re UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gibson, No. 103188/07, slip op. at 1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 2007).
166. Lipner, supranote 12, at 79.
167. See Elisofon, supra note 20, at 3 (observing that Rule 2080 lacked direction for judges);
Lipner, supra note 12, at 80 (viewing their role as extremely limited in the confirmation process).
168. See Donovan, supra note 19, at 1-2 (describing Cuomo's intervention in all cases);
Lipner, supra note 12, at 79-86 (describing the prior case decisions that ultimately doomed
Cuomo's cause).
169. See supraPart IL.A.
170. See PIABA Study, supranote 12, at 2 (quoting Scott llgenfritz).
171. See llgenfritz, supra note 3, at 360-61 (failing to apply guidelines and rubber-stamping
awards); Jamieson, Record-Cleaning,supra note 137 (arguing arbitrator determinations are unclear
because of how quick they make them); Lipner, supra note 12, at 96 (imposing Rule 2080 changed
nothing, as the rule was "vague and over-lapping").
172. Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 362; see also Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change
Amending the Codes of Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow
When Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 66086, 66087 (Nov. 6, 2008)
(granting expungement without reviewing settlement agreement).
173. See supranotes 170-72 and accompanying text.
174. See lgenfritz, supra note 3, at 351 (identifying commentater arguments with the
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court what it must find or what the arbitrator must find for a court to
confirm" an award directing expungement.' 7 5 Lipner has recognized that
"[t]here's a certain amount of vagueness in [the] current
standards ... .,,176 The lack of guidance provided in the rules affects the
court confirmation process too, as a court that denied an expungement
confirmation request indicated, the court would have confirmed it if the
arbitration panel had provided "amended awards containing specific
affirmative factual findings in each case justifying the expungement
recommendations, along with the portions of the record on which those
findings are based ....177
A considerable lack of input on behalf of the customer after an
award is issued is a further point of contention with the current
guidelines. 78 FINRA has indicated that it does not believe the absence
of the customer leads to any presumption of consent to expungement on
the customer's behalf. 79 However, industry lawyers have said that they
believe an investor's testimony could possibly sway an arbitrator to
decline the broker's expungement request.' 80 One industry attorney felt
that, "one-sided hearings inherently lack[ed] the adversarial mechanism
needed for fact-finding."' 181
Further, the relative ease with which FTNRA can remove itself as an
additional party limits the involvement it will have with a given
expungement claim. 182 Take, for instance, the current Rule
2080(b)(2)(B), which allows FINRA to remove itself as an additional
party if "the expungement would have no material adverse effect on
investor protection, the integrity of the CRD system or regulatory
guidelines when the rules were initially passed); Lipner, supra note 12, at 62 (instituting Rule 2080
was supposed to limit expungements but has only acted as rubber-stamping the process).
175. In re Kay v. Abrams, 853 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
176. Jamieson, New FinraRules, supranote 139 (quoting Seth Lipner).
177. In re Johnson v. Summit Equities, Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 873, 901 (Sup. Ct. 2008); see also
Lipner, supra note 12, at 81-83 (discussing the reasoning behind the Johnson decision). An
arbitrator in a recent decision indicated that few arbitration decisions actually reflect the higher
standard of proof required, and any claim supported by some reasonable proof can not be labeled as
false. See Award FINRA Dispute Resolution at 4, In re Gilliam v. SagePoint Fin., Inc., No. 1203717 (July 19, 2013) (Meyer, Arb.), available at http://finraawardsonline.finra.org/viewdocument
aspx?DocNB=61402.
178. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 97-98 (considering only broker testimony at hearings).
179. See Regulatory Notice 12-18, FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed New In re
Expungement Procedures for Persons Not Named in a Customer-Initiated Arbitration, FINRA (Apr.
2012), at 8, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/
p 125947.pdf (providing the ability for the customer to attend or be represented at hearing).
180. Barlyn, supranote 10.
181. Lipner, supra note 12, at 88 (internal quotations omitted).
182. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 363 (suggesting FINRA should play a larger role because
their current involvement is not enough); Mason, supra note 24, at 84 (suggesting that the NASD
would have a lack of involvement in the process).
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requirements." ' 83 FINRA has consistently indicated that information
should not be expunged from the CRD unless it has no meaningful
investor protection or regulatory value. 184 Thus, all expungement awards
granted by arbitration panels should no longer have any value to the
CRD, 185 which means in all circumstances FINRA would be able to rely
on Rule 2080(b)(2) to remove itself as an additional party, and to
describe the claim as an extraordinary circumstance is factually
incorrect. 1 86 Rule 2080(b)(2) only adds to the current redundancy and
ineffectiveness of both Rule 2080 and Rule 12805.187
IV.

MODIFYING THE CURRENT RULES

As this Note has identified, the current FINRA expungement
process continues to prove its inadequacy, and will only continue to
endanger investors for as long as the current expungement guidelines are
in effect.188 Expungement was implemented by FINRA in order to be an
extraordinary remedy, one that should be awarded only when the
information in question has no meaningful investor protection or
regulatory value. 189 However, it is time to stop and realize that
expungement is no longer an extraordinary remedy, it has become
nothing short of an ordinary remedy. 190 There are parts of the securities
industry that have recognized the existing issue with the expungement
process, 19' and it is now time for FINRA, and subsequently
the SEC, to
192
admit that there is a problem that needs to be fixed.
This Part will suggest, and succinctly identify, a solution to the
current expungement issue. 193 Subpart A will provide the first step
183. FINRA MANUAL R. 2080(b)(2)(B) (2011).
184. E.g., Lee, supra note 9, at 2; Notice to Arbitrators, supra note 7; see also Notice to
Members 99-54, supra note 88, at 352 ("[l]nformation should not be expunged without good
reason....").
185. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., Too Easy for Brokers to Clean Records, Lawyers Say,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20131016/FREE/131019905 (speaking with an attorney who believes FINRA should get rid of
expungement, as all information should be on the CRD).
186. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 73-75.
187. See supra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part HlA-B.
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
190. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 360; supra Part IlI.A. 1.
191. See supra note 24.
192. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (identifying that FINRA has begun the process
of approving one new rule and submitting it to the SEC for review).
193. See infra Part IV.A-C. As this Note proposes changes to current rules, it is important to
have an understanding of the FINRA rulemaking process. See FINRA Rulemaking Process, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/industry/regulation/finRARules/rulemakingProcess (last visited July 20, 2014)
(providing an overview of the rule making process from proposal to confirmation).
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towards fixing the current expungement process with modifications and
additions to the current FINRA Rule 2080.194 The proposed solution will
continue in Subpart B with necessary amendments that should be made
to the current FINRA Rule 12805, providing stricter and more expansive
requirements.195 Finally, Subpart C will discuss the possibility of
proposing additional training guidelines for current FINRA arbitrators
196
and whether or not they are necessary for the purposes of this solution.
A. Amending CurrentFINRA Rule 2080
When considering the current Rule 2080, it must be kept in mind
that it serves as the first step of the expungement process, as it allows
FINRA to waive its right to be named as an additional party.' 97 FINRA's
participation in the process should be a priority to an organization tasked
with regulating the securities industry, where protecting investors is of
primary concern. 198 Waiving the right to participate in the expungement
process creates a situation where arbitrators are rubber-stamping
expungement awards, as there is no real supervision or ramifications for
not following guidelines. 199 Resolving such an issue begins with
ensuring more FINRA involvement than is currently taking place.2 °0
Initially, when considering what aspects of the current Rule 2080 to
leave unchanged, section (a) of Rule 2080 should be one of those
sections. 20 1 Despite the court system often being reluctant to enter into
the details of the process and overturn awards 20 2 (except in rare
instances), 20 3 requiring a court to confirm the award still allows for that
possibility, which is why section (a) of Rule 2080 is a necessity. 20 4 The
194. See infra Part TV.A.
195. See infra Part IV.B.
196. See infra Part V.C.
197. FINRA MANUAL R. 2080(b)(2) (2011).
198. See About FINRA, supranote 10.
199. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 360-61 (reasoning that rubber-stamping occurs when
arbitrators issue expungement awards in settlement cases without following mandated FINRA
requirements); Lipner, supra note 12, at 62 (allowing for rubber-stamping of awards is a problem
with the current rule).
200. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 363 (suggesting that FINRA play a more active role);
Schoeff, Jr., supra note 185 ("Finra needs to take more action to protect investors." (quoting Jason
Doss)). But see S. Lawrence Polk & Avital Stadler, Expungement Games: A Closer Look at
PIABA 's Study and FINRA 's Response, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 2013, at 1 (suggesting that
more restrictions are unnecessary as there are adequate regulations in place to protect investors).
201. See FINRA MANUAL R. 2080(a) (2011); infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text
(explaining why the section will be beneficial). But see Lipner, supra note 12, at 101 (suggesting
that the court confirmation process provides no additional safeguards).
202. See supra Part III.A.3.
203. See Lipner, supranote 12, at 81-83 (discussing In re Johnson).
204. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (identifying an attempt at court
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remainder of the current Rule 2080 is where this Note suggests
modifications to improve the expungement process.20 5 Rule 2080
must be altered to include much more diligent involvement from
FINRA, both before the claim reaches the arbitration stage, and also
throughout the claim as well, including the court confirmation
process.20 6 The following is a draft proposal for a modified Rule 2080,
excluding section (a) of Rule 2080:207
(b) Prior to mailing an expungement motion to the presiding
arbitrator(s),FINRA must critically review the motion. Based on
such review, FINRA may determine that it will interject to make
thefinal decision on whether to awardexpungement, thus making
A critical
the decision of the arbitrator(s) a recommendation.
20 8
following:
the
include
must
review of the motion
(1) An assessment of any monetary award issued to the
claimant in the initial arbitrationhearing,"20 9 and
(2) An assessment of the number of times the moving party
has requestedexpungement awardprior to this motion.21° This
number must be communicated to the panel when the motion is
sentfrom FINRA.21l
(c) Members or associated persons petitioning a court for
expungement relief must name FINRA as an additional party and
serve FINRA with all appropriate documents unless this
requirement is waived pursuant to subparagraph (1) or (2) below.
FINRA may not waive its obligation to be named as an additional
party in any claim seeking expungement involving a settlement
are inapplicable to
agreement, thus the following subparagraphs
12
agreement.2
settlement
a
involving
claim
any
confirmation and how the courts see themselves in such a role). This Note acknowledges the
potential issue regarding the court system's larger role in this matter; however, it is a much larger
issue than this Note's intended purpose and would be better resolved in a separate piece.
205. See infra notes 208-33 and accompanying text (outlining a new rule proposal and the
reasons for the proposal).
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. Modifications and additions to the current Rule 2080 are indicated by italics.
208. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 363 (suggesting similar critical review); Lipner, supra note
12, at 103 (making a similar suggestion for FINRA to receive notice earlier).
209. See supra Part 1I.B (discussing the arbitration process and its importance).
210. See llgenfritz, supra note 3, at 363 (suggesting the assessment of the number of prior
expungement requests as aspects to consider for additional arbitrator training); see also Lipner,
supra note 12, at 97-98 (mentioning prior awards as something not included in the current system).
211. The following draft of section (c) is a rewrite of the current section 2080(b). See FINRA
MANUAL R. 2080(b) (2011).
212. There have been industry professionals who have suggested adjusting the settlement
process. See llgenfritz, supra note 3, at 362-63 (suggesting stricter penalties for abusing the
settlement process along with more expansive arbitrator training); Lazaro, supra note 17, at 98
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(1) Upon request, FINRA may waive the obligation to name
FINRA as a party if FINRA determines that the expungement
relief is based on affirmative judicial or arbitral findings that:
(A) the claim, allegation or information is factually
impossible or clearly erroneous.2 13 FINRA must consider the
following guidelines tojustify such afinding:
(i) Any monetary compensation awarded to the claimaint
through the initial, non-expungement arbitration claim;
and
(ii) Whether the party requesting expungement was found
liable as a result of the initialarbitrationhearing.
(B) the registered person was not involved in the alleged
investment-related sales practice violation, forgery, theft,
misappropriation or conversion of funds; 2 14 or
(C) the claim, allegation or information is false. FINRA
must consider the following guidelines to justify such a
finding:
(i) Any monetary compensation awarded to the claimant
through the initial, non-expungement arbitration claim;
and
(ii) Whether the party requesting expungement was found
liable as a result of the initialarbitrationhearing.
(2) If the expungement relief is based on judicial or arbitral
findings other than those described above, FINRA, in its sole
discretion and under extraordinary circumstances, also may
waive the obligation to name FINRA as a party if it determines
that:
(A) the expungement relief and accompanying findings on
which it is based are meritorious.2t 5

(suggesting expungment is removed entirely from the settlement process); Lipner, supra note 12, at
103-04 (suggesting that arbitrators no longer make decisions and someone other than FINRA should
make award decisions instead); Schoeff, Jr., supra note 185 (speaking with an attorney who
suggested that arbitrators should not be involved in the settlement process at all).
213. See Lee, supra note 9, at 3 (indicating an example of a factually impossible claim would
be "if the registered person was not [actually] handling the customer's account at the time of dispute
and no liability was found" during the initial arbitration).
214. FINRA MANUAL R. 2080(b)(1)(B). Clause (b)(1)(B) is not changed in this proposal, as it
serves its current purpose adequately, because preventing brokers from expunging detrimental
erroneous claims can adversely affect their careers. See Barlyn, supranote 10 (carrying black marks
from unproven claims should not be an industry norm); Mason, supra note 24, at 87 ("Ever try to
switch brokerages with such a record? You are radioactive .... ).
215. Section (b)(2)(B) was removed as this Note determined it to be redundant. See supra text
accompanying notes 183-87.
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(d)If FINRA waives its obligationto be named as an additional
party it must provide a briefwritten explanation indicatingwhich
finding they based their decision on as well as a description
supported by evidence or testimony as to why the (c)(1)(A)-(C)
or (c) (2) (A) finding was applicable.16
The general purpose behind the modified Rule 2080 proposal is to
ensure more substantive involvement from FINRA throughout the
process. 21 7 Requiring FINRA's review prior to the expungement motion
being sent to the arbitrators ensures FINRA's understanding of all
expungement cases before they begin, instead of after the award is
granted as it is under the current system.21 8 While the addition of
proposed Rule 2080(b) leaves the decision of whether to completely
interject up to FINRA, requiring. FINRA to make itself more
knowledgeable regarding all expungement claims will benefit the
entire process. 219
The ultimate rationale behind the proposed Rule 2080(c), currently
Rule 2080(b), is to help alleviate the previously identified issue of
unclear guidelines. 220 Further, as also discussed, the most critical issue
currently facing FINRA is the rate at which expungements are being
granted as a result of settlement agreements. 2 Moreover, expungement
agreements via settlement present the strongest possibility for deception
and non-merited expungements 2 2 The proposal is not requiring FINRA
to be involved in every proceeding, only those involving settlement
agreements. 223 Moreover, if FINRA's purpose is truly to protect
investors, it will need to devote the resources necessary to remain
informed of proceedings involving settlements in order to prevent the
continued expungement of valuable CRD information. 24
216. The current Rule 2080(c) remains unchanged and becomes 2080(e) in this proposal.
217. See supra notes 197-211 and accompanying text.
218. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 362 (explaining FINRA's current process of receiving a
motion for expungement relief, not reviewing it, and sending a copy to the arbitration panel).
219. See id. at 363 (arguing FINRA does not currently play an active enough role and must
make itself more knowledgeable); Lipner, supra note 12, at 103 (arguing FINRA must insert itself
into the dispute earlier to become more knowledgeable).
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. See supra Part III.A.1.
222. See supra Part I.A.
223. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
224. Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 362 (suggesting similar review from FINRA to return
expungement to an extraordinary remedy). The recently submitted proposal to the SEC is a step in
the right direction. See Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 2081, supra note 119; see also
Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, U.S. Aims to Fix Broker Records, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB30001424052702303887804579503653564597512?.mg=ren
o64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle$2FSB3000142405270230388780457950
3653564597512.html (indicating that FINRA may propose a rule change that will require firms to
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The purpose of narrowing the guidelines under which FINRA may
excuse itself is to provide further clarity. 225 It is important for all parties
involved to understand under what circumstances FINRA may remove
2
itself as a party. 226
6 Moreover, it is important for FINRA to consider
whether monetary compensation was given, as firms do not typically pay
out sums of money where claims are clearly erroneous or factually
impossible.2 27 The desire to get further understanding out of FINRA is
aided by the addition of Rule 2080(d), which requires a written
explanation.22 8 As FINRA requires the arbitrator to provide a written
explanation, FINRA should not be exempt from the same practice.229
Providing a written explanation-supported by factual evidencefurther protects against the rubber-stamping of awards.230
The proposed modifications to Rule 2080 serve the initial purpose
of gaining more extensive FINRA participation in the expungement
process. 23' FINRA's current lack of participation has resulted in the
absence of guidance and thoroughness within arbitration panels. 232 A
modified Rule 2080 can not change the process on its own, though; thus,
a modification to the current Rule 12805 instituting stricter guidelines to
grant expungements is necessary as well.233
B. Modifying CurrentRule 12805
Along with the current Rule 2080, its companion Rule 12805 must
be adjusted as well, to ensure that the expungement process is further
improved.2 34 As it currently stands, the guidelines of Rule 12805 do not
provide enough significant concrete direction for an arbitration panel to
follow. 23 5 While certain aspects of Rule 12805 will remain in the
perform background checks on all brokers to ensure better accuracy of information on the CRD).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 208-16 (outlining the text of the proposed rule).
226. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of unclear
guidelines).
227. See Ilgenfritz, supranote 3, at 362.
228. See supratext accompanying note 216.
229. FINRA MANUAL R. 12805(c) (2011) (requiring a written explanation from the arbitrator).
230. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 361 (identifying rubber-stamping as an adverse effect on
the current CRD system); Lipner, supra note 12, at 62 (acknowledging the current issue with
rubber-stamping awards).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 197-200 (outlining the issues with F1NRA's current
participation in the expungement process); see also supra text accompanying notes 208-16
(outlining the proposed rule).
232. See supra Part IH.B.
233. See infra Part V.B.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 240-79 (proposing new provisions of Rule 12805).
235. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 362 (showing the widespread sentiment that arbitrators are
not adequately following the procedures outlined in FINRA's rules, and thus, not affording the
proper level of importance to what they decide to expunge and take off the CRD); Lipner, supra
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proposed role,236 the general rule must be restructured in order to ensure
that investor safety remains FINRA's number one priority.237 The need
for change stems from the initial clause's lack of requirement for both
the claimant to be involved in the hearing, and the claimant not being
238 The following is a proposed re-draft of
required to testify.
239
Rule 12805(a):
(a) Hold a recorded hearing session (by telephone or in person)
240
both the
where bt
regarding the appropriateness of expungement,
party seeking expungement and the customer responsible for the
original claim, or the customer's attorney, are present. This
paragraph will apply to cases administered under Rule 12800, even
if a customer did not request a hearing on the merits. The recorded
hearing must be conducted pursuant to each of the following
subparagraphs:
(1) The arbitrator(s)must question each party under oath
regarding the potential expungement award and record all
testimony;24 1 and
(2) If the claim involves an agreed upon settlement between
the parties, the arbitrator(s)must question the customer, or the
customer's attorney, as to why expungement was agreed to
why the customer's attorney agreed to
and, if applicable,
242
claim.
the
dismiss
Requiring customers, or the customer's attorney, to be present for
all hearings, even if they did not request such a hearing, prevents the
party seeking expungement from dominating the fact-finding process.243
Further, the addition of required testimony will allow arbitrators to delve
further into the facts of the case.244 This additional information will
ideally uncover any situation where the expungement-seeking party
note 12, at 103-04 (going as far as suggesting that the current system with arbitrators is so flawed,
arbitrators should be removed entirely).
236. See infra note 240 (identifying the carried-over text from the original Rule 12805).
237. See infra text accompanying notes 238-79; see also supra text accompanying note 58

(identifying investor protection as primary purpose).
238. See FINRA MANUAL R. 12805(a) (2011); Lipner, supranote 12, at 99 (identifying Barker
v. Securities America, Inc., and describing the peculiar absence of testimony, alluding to its
necessity but not going so far as to make it a requirement) (citing In re Barker v. Sec. Am., Inc., No.
12-01305, 2013 WL 595840 (FINRA Aug. 15, 2013) (Connett, Arb.)).

239. Modifications and additions to the current clause are indicated in italics.
240. FINRA MANUAL R. 12805(a) (2011).
241.
242.
243.
244.

See Lipner, supranote 12, at 97-98 (suggesting the need for testimony).
See id. at 98 (agreeing that no exparte hearing will ever be successful).
See supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
See Lipner, supra note 12, at 97-98 (noting that the hearing is usually only attended by

party seeking expungement, meaning the arbitration panel only hears one-sided evidence, which is
insufficient to make expungement decisions).
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attempted to coerce the customer into a settlement2agreement
contingent
45
on not opposing the broker's expungement request.
There are, understandably, possible issues and concerns, primarily
on behalf of the customer and his attorney, with requiring customer
participation in the hearing.246 However, action must be taken to prevent
the continued practice of brokers attending expungement hearings
unopposed.24 7 It is predictable that no investor would put himself
through further hearings or pay more attorneys' fees in a case where he
has already received his compensation. 48 A potential solution to the
attorney fee issue would be for the broker seeking expungement to pay
the portion of attorney fees required by the expungement hearing.249 An
arbitrator's responsibility to hear a full disclosure of evidence is
critically important, 25 and thus the reason for making the customer's
presence at the hearing a requirement. 251
The second clause in Rule 12805 pertains to arguably the biggest
issue within the current expungement process-awards deriving from
settlement agreements.2 52 As previously addressed, granting an
expungement award based on a settlement agreement between the two
parties presents a multitude of dilemmas; most important is the threat of
necessary and valuable information being wrongfully expunged from the
CRD. 53 Keeping with the current structure of Rule 12805(b), this Note
proposes the following significant additions and modifications to make
the clause more effective in preventing
the undeserved expungement of
254
customer dispute information:
(b) In cases involving settlements, in addition to testimony
requirements outlined in paragraph (a), arbitrator(s)must review
settlement documents and consider the amount of payments made to
any party and any other terms and conditions of settlement.
245. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (identifying FINRA's recent movement to
deter such conduct).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 178-81 (outlining arguments for customer
participation).
247. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 97-98 (outlining the consequences of brokers attending
hearings unopposed).
248. See id. at 88; see also Elisofon, supra note 20, at 3 (understanding the customer's
mindset-brokers are able to take advantage of customers when offering monetary compensation
through settlement).
249. See infra text accompanying and immediately following note 277 (proposing a new
section (d)(l) to Rule 12805).
250. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 98 (continuing absence of investor's attorney under current
rules likely leads to the burying of the truth).
251. See infra text following note 254 (identifying text of proposed rule).
252. See supra Part III.A.
253. See supra Part III.A.
254. All modifications and additions to the current clause are indicated in italics.
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Arbitrator(s) must also coordinate with FINRA on all cases
involving settlements pursuant to each of the following
subparagraphs:
(1) FINRA must receive all settlement documents, testimony,
and any other applicable evidence from the arbitrationpanel
prior to the panel confirming any grant of expungement," and
(2) The arbitration panel must provide FINRA with its
recommendation on whether expungement is appropriateand
FINRA will control the final determination of whether such a
recommendation is confirmed or denied; and
(3) FINRA's review of the case prior to making a final
determination must include:
(A) Review of all documents provided by the arbitration
panel, including listening to the recordedhearing; and
(B) Speak with the arbitrationpanel, either in person or
telephonically, regarding their
rationale behind
recommendation and ascertain whether all required
protocols were followed; and
(C) If determined to be necessary by FINRA, conduct a
follow-up meeting, either telephonically or in person, with
both parties to discuss relevant evidence and determine
whether reasonfor settlement was coerced during settlement
negotiations.
(i) If FINRA determines settlement was obtained through
coercion or bad faith during negotiations, FINRA must
immediately reject the request for expungement and
dismiss the claim.
While the changes this proposal makes to the current Rule 12805(b)
are drastic, the current expungernent landscape calls for such wholesale
changes.2 56 Requiring that FINRA control the final determination of
expungement awards on all claims involving settlements not only
removes the possibility of arbitrators rubber-stamping expungement
awards, but it also ensures a stricter approach that ideally tips the scales
back in favor of investor protection.257 Further, while instituting three
separate FINRA requirements prior to making a final determination may
appear excessive, the current industry sentiment towards FINRA's
255. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 103 (suggesting similar disclosure of documents to ensure
state regulators have time to object).
256. See supra Part HLI.A-B.
257. See lgenfritz, supra note 3, at 361 (identifying rubber-stamping as current problem);
Lipner, supra note 12, at 98 ("Arbitrators just recite the denials that the broker offers during the
ex-parte expungement hearing.").
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existing approach calls for such drastic measures. 8 Moreover, this
Note's proposal for a modified Rule 12805(b) favors leniency and
common sense with regards to section (b)(3)(C).25 9 It would be senseless
to propose further participation from the customers, and most likely the
customers' attorneys, when their participation is already required during
the arbitration.260 Despite FINRA's recent failures,26' the proposed rule
change relies on the arbitration panel to collect all substantial
information from each party, which FINRA will then have to review at
its disposal.262 Ideally, such information will provide enough of a basis
for FINRA to make its determination. However, where any factual
inconsistencies or discrepancies arise during the determination process,
FINRA must conduct the necessary follow up meeting and not simply
adhere to the arbitration panel's recommendation.263
Considering next the current Rule 12805(c), a proposal to change
the current clause must center on deriving clarity from the arbitration
panel's written explanation.2 64 Under the current rule,265 many
explanations are being considered nothing more than formalities, with
arbitrators simply identifying the Rule 2080 grounds for expungement
and providing no further written explanation.2 66 Requiring a written
explanation from the arbitration panel is a beneficial idea in concept, but
more detail must be provided within the rule to ensure that the
arbitration panel can not turn the explanation into a short formality
granting expungement.2 67 The following additions would not only
provide greater clarity to arbitrators drafting the explanation, but would
also ensure that FINRA, under the proposed Rule 12805(b) discussed
269
above, 268 has a more accurate report on the panel's recommendation:
258. See supra Part HI.A.
259. See supratext immediately following note 254.
260. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 88 (discussing why a customer has no desire to be part of the
process after receiving compensation); supratext immediately following note 254.
261. See supra Part I.A. 1 (identifying the high rate of expungements granted under FINRA's
current guidance).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 241-42 and text immediately following note 254.
263. See supra Part 1I.B.
264. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (identifying the issue with arbitrators
rubber-stamping their written explanation).
265. FINRA MANUAL R. 12805(c) (2011).
266. See In re Barker v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-01305, 2013 WL 595840, at *3 (FINRA Aug.
15, 2013) (Connett, Arb.) (granting expungement on over thirty separate claims in one session);
Lipner, supra note 12, at 99 (granting all Barker expungements in one hearing). In another claim, In
re York v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, the arbitrator's grounds for expungement was a word-forword recital of the stipulation submitted by the party. No. 11-03966, 2012 WL 4847068, at *2-3
(FINRA Oct. 2, 2012) (Knotter, Arb.); see Lipner, supra note 12, at 98 n.276.
267. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text immediately following note 254 (identifying rule proposal).
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(c) Indicate in the arbitration award which of the Rule 2080
grounds for expungement serve(s) as the basis for its expungement
award and provide a brief written explanation of the reason(s) for its
finding that one or more Rule 2080 grounds for expungement
applies to the facts of the case. All explanations of findings must
provide the following information displayed in subparagraphs(1)(3), along with any additionalinformation deemed beneficial by the
arbitrator(s)[all written explanations of claims involving settlement
agreements must be labeled as 'recommendation' and be made
pursuantto the guidelines in Rule 12805(b)]:
(1) Evidence or testimony supporting the Rule 2080 ground(s)
specified; and
(2) In claims involving settlement agreements, agreed upon
settlementfigures andjustificationsas to why such a claim should
be dismissedwhen the party seeking the expungement is providing
the customer monetary compensation; and
(3) Explanation of why non-cited Rule 2080 ground(s) did not
support an expungement award.
Providing such detail to the written explanation will serve the
purpose of deterring arbitrators from seeing the written explanation as a
mere formality.2 70 Moreover, requiring the arbitrator to assert the
specific evidence or testimony on which the decision was based builds
on that same purpose. 27' A more detailed explanation will help to deter
the current practice of arbitrators simply following the written
explanation provided by the broker seeking expungement.27 2
The final clause in the current Rule 12805(d), requires one
additional subsection to make it more effective under the proposals
outlined in this Note.273 FINRA's original inclusion of a clause assessing
forum fees is essential.27 4 However, with the addition to section (a)
requiring customers, or their attorneys, to be present for a hearing,275 the
269. Modifications and additions to the current clause are indicated in italics.
270. See In re Hyman v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 12-02969, 2013 WL 2368505, at *2 (FINRA Aug.
5, 2013) (Connett, Arb.) (granting six expungements in one hearing); In re Gilliam v. SagePoint
Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949, at *3 (FINRA July 19, 2013) (Meyer, Arb.) (arguing
that the current process requires the panel to play "devil's advocate" with ex parte evidence); In re
Miller v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 11-03509, 2013 WL 1933872, at *1 (FINRA May 1, 2013) (Loss,
Gray & Pleiss, Arbs.) (showing the mere formality of the current process as eleven separate
expungements were granted).
271. See supra note 266 (identifying examples that will ideally be resolved under the new
proposal).
272. See Lipner, supra note 12, at 98.
273. See supraPart IV.A; text accompanying notes 234-72.
274. FINRA MANuAL R. 12805(d) (2011).
275. See supratext accompanying notes 240-41.
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rationale behind forum fees must change
slightly.27 6 A modified
277
proposal of Rule 12805(d) is as follows:
(d) Assess all forum fees for hearing sessions in which the sole
topic is the determination of the appropriateness of expungement
against the parties requesting expungement relief.
(1) The party requesting expungement relief is responsiblefor
all attorneys'fees associated with the customer's presence, or
legal representation,at the awardhearing.
While it may appear overly detrimental to the expungement-seeking
party, requiring that party to cover the customer's legal fees is the only
legitimate way to ensure the customer's interaction in the process. 278 The
list of reasons why a customer would be unlikely to participate in an
expungement hearing has been described above, and addressing that
glaring issue requires a drastic step. 279 Although it may appear unfair to
require such action from the expungement-seeking party, the proposal
justifies itself on the notion that expungement is intended to be an
extraordinary remedy, and thus, a party seeking expungement may be
required to pay an extraordinary price for such an award.28 °
C. Addressing FINRA 's Inadequate Trainingfor Arbitrators
The current training required of arbitrators becomes less of a dire
issue if the modified rule proposals presented above are implemented. 281
However, since members of the industry have discussed possible
changes to arbitrator training, this Note finds it necessary to at least
briefly discuss it.2 82 Moreover, FINRA needs to provide further direction
with regards to significant questions to ask during a hearing to ensure
that the most informed decision is being made.2 83 While the proposed
rules above diminish the need for an extensive training overhaul, 8 4
276. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
277. Modifications and additions to the current clause are indicated in italics.
278. See Lipner, supranote 12, at 88 (identifying the complete lack of incentive for an investor
to currently appear at the expungement hearing).
279. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
280. See Notice to Arbitrators,supranote 7.
281. See supra Part V.A-B. The more detailed inclusion of FINRA in the proposed solution
will mitigate some of the current issues of the arbitrators primarily working on their own. Ilgenfritz,
supranote 3, at 362 (describing FINRA's current practice of not reviewing an expungement motion,
and instead, sending it to arbitrators without a prior review).
282. See Ilgenfritz, supra note 3, at 363 (emphasizing the need for more importance to be
placed on the integrity of the CRD system); Lazaro, supra note 17, at 98 (receiving effective
training is important to fully understand the significance of an expungement request); Lipner, supra
note 12, at 101 (arguing that no amount of training will fix the current expungement process).
283. See Ilgenfritz, supranote 3, at 363.
284. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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industry
addressing arbitrator training through ways suggested by other
286
members 285 can certainly benefit the expungement process.
V.

CONCLUSION

The current expungement process is not serving its intended
purpose of only expunging information that would hold no value to the
CRD.287 Under the current system, investors are being encouraged to
research registered brokers despite the likely result that they will be
reviewing inadequate information of those brokers.288 While such lack of
information may not seem like a primary issue of concern, the current
guidelines have already caused investor harm and will likely continue to
do so. 289 This Note's proposed solutions advocating for more extensive
FINRA involvement, as well as more detailed and stricter guidelines for
arbitrators, would remove many of the current issues that exist.2 90 Tilting
the scales back toward investor protection will better inform investors
and ensure that the information investors currently lack does not end up
hurting them.2 9'
James T. Farris*

285. See supra note 281.
286. See supra note 280.
287. See Notice to Arbitrators,supra note 7; supra note 58 and accompanying text; supra Part
III.A-B (identifying why the process is not serving its purpose).
288. See Lynnley Browning, Site That Tracks Brokers Questioned on Erased Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at CIO ("BrokerCheck gives you no assurance that you're dealing with
somebody who has a clean record." (quoting Pat Huddleston)); Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 25
(suggesting investors using BrokerCheck risk wrongfully believing information on a broker's
record).
289. See supranotes 2-6 and accompanying text.
290. See supraPart IV.A-B.
291. See supraPart IV.
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